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CRIMINAL LAW-THEFT OF USE OF COMPUTER SERVIcE~tate 
v. McGraw, 459 N.E.2d 61 (Ind. App. Ct. 1984). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With the current profusion of computers in our society, the state 
of the law concerning the theft of computer time and services becomes 
increasingly important. Recently, the Indiana State Court of Appeals 
Second District faced the issue in State v. McGraw. 1 In McGraw, the 
court considered whether the unauthorized use of computer services 
constituted theft as a matter of law under the Indiana statute.2 The 
court held that a theft had occurred. 3 
A jury found Michael McGraw guilty of two counts of theft of 
computer services in Marion Superior Court, Criminal Division.4 
Prior to sentencing, the trial court granted the defendant's motion to 
dismiss the two counts of theft because the facts stated did not consti­
tute an offense against the state; thus, the court had no jurisdiction. S 
Additionally, the evidence brought to trial did not constitute such an 
offense as found in the two counts of theft.6 Subsequently, the State 
appealed to the Court of Appeals of Indiana.7 
The defendant was charged with a number of offenses, of which 
the two counts of theft have relevance in the appellate level opinion.8 
From January, 1980, until March, 1981, the Indianapolis Department 
of Planning and Zoning employed McGraw as a computer operator 
and he used a city computer in his private business of selling Natur­
Slim, a dietary product.9 When the city discharged McGraw, he 
asked a colleague to obtain a print-out of the NaturSlim information 
1. 459 N.E.2d 61 (Ind. App. Ct. 1984). 
2. IND. CoDE ANN. § 35-43-4-2(a) (Burns 1974 & 1984 Supp.). 
3. McGraw, 459 N.E.2d at 65. 
4. Id. at 62. 
5. Id at 62-63. 
6. Id. at 63. 
7. Id. 
8. Id at 62. The two identical counts charged that the defendant "did unlawfully 
and knowingly exert unauthorized control over property belonging to the City of Indianap­
olis" and used the computer with the intent to deprive the city of something of value, a 
portion of the computer's services. Id 
9. Id. The city leased computer service from Marion County to be used by city 
departments: the defendant's terminal was in the City-County building. McGraw used the 
computer for client lists, inventory control, client birthdates, client and potential client 
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and then remove the data from the computer's memory.lO Instead of 
doing so, the colleague informed his supervisor. The investigation that 
followed revealed McGraw's unauthorized activities, overwhelmingly 
evidenced by the print-out which consisted of a sheaf of papers four 
inches to five inches thick, eleven inches wide, and fifteen inches 
10ng. 11 
II. ANALYSIS 
The appellate court relied heavily on Indiana statutes defining 
theft and property in its analysis and decision. The legislature defined 
theft as follows: 
A person who knowingly or intentionally exerts unauthorized con­
trol over property of another person, with intent to deprive the 
other person of any part of its value or use, commits theft, a Class D 
felony. 12 
Further, it defined property as: 
anything of value; and includ[ing] a gain or advantage or anything 
that might reasonably be regarded as such by the beneficiary; real 
property, personal property, money, labor, and services; intangibles; 
commercial instruments; written instruments concerning labor, 
services, or property; written instruments otherwise of value to the 
owner, such as a public record, deed, will, credit card, or letter of 
credit; a signature to a written instrument; extension of credit, trade 
secrets; contract rights, choses-in-action, and other interests in or 
claims to wealth; electricity, gas, oil, and water; captured or domes­
tic animals, birds, and fish; food and drink; and human remains. 13 
To reinstate the conviction against the defendant, the appellate 
court had to find that his actions fell within the statutory definitions of 
theft and property. McGraw had asserted that under the statutes the 
charges against him could not stand, basing his argument on four fac­
tors.14 First, he argued that because the theft statute is divided into a 
conduct portion and an intent portion and the word "use" does not 
appear in the conduct portion, the unauthorized control must be over 
the property itself.15 Second, he asserted that the property statute 
correspondence, and other business materials. Further, he had been reprimanded for sell­
ing NaturSlim on city time, a factor in his ultimate dismissal. Id. at 62-63. 
10. /d. at 63. 
11. Id. The print-out constituted the tangible result of the alleged theft. 
12. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-4-2(a) (Burns 1974 and 1984 Supp.). 
13. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-1-2 (Burns 1979) (repealed 1983). 
14. McGraw, 459 N.E.2d at 63. 
15. Id. at 63. 
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does not employ the word "use" as such and that the theft statute, 
which speaks of control over property, does not include the word 
"use."16 Further, McGraw claimed that the term "services" in the 
property statute applies only in the context of labor.l7 Finally, Mc­
Graw stated that his conduct was not specifically prohibited by stat­
ute, that the city could use the computer while he did,18 that the value 
of the services he used were minimal, and that his activities parallelled 
personal use of an office phone, calculator, or copy machine. 19 He 
argued that the city could not claim to have been deprived of use of 
the computer unless he had overloaded the memory with his personal 
data, or if he had interfered with the city's use. 
Because clearly McGraw knowingly and intentionally used the 
city's computer for his own personal business use, the issue narrowed 
to whether the "use" of computer time constitutes property subject to 
theft.20 The courts have not widely addressed the issue; thus the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana faced a case of first impression.21 Look­
ing to any possible source, the court found that the defendant relied 
too heavily on common law concepts that no longer apply to modem 
statutes and that establish much broader definitions of "theft" and 
"property."22 The court found only one applicable case within its ju­
risdiction.23 Although Moser v. State 24 deals with cable television 
services, it nevertheless indicated that the court defined property more 
broadly than McGraw.2s The Moser court found that cable television 
services equalled something of value whether categorized as a service, 
a signal, or both.26 In addition, a decade earlier, the appellate court 
had found in Helvey v. Wabash County REMC27 that electricity may 
be subject to theft.28 Both Moser and Helvey exhibited the willingness 
of the Court of Appeals of Indiana to interpret the property statute 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. at 63-64. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 64. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 64-65. 
23. Id. at 64. 
24. 433 N.E.2d 68 (1982). The defendant was charged with using cable television 
services without paying for them, an offense covered by IND. CoDE ANN. 35-43-5-3(a)(5) 
(Burns Supp. 1984). Moser, 433 N.E.2d at 68 n.1. 
25. Moser, 433 N.E.2d at 70. 
26. Id. at 71. 
27. 151 Ind. App. 176,278 N.E.2d 608 (1972), citing IND. CoDE ANN. § 35-1-66-3 
(Burns 1971). 
28. Helvey, 151 Ind. App. at 179,278 N.E.2d at 610. 
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more broadly than McGraw would have preferred. The court in Mc­
Graw followed, finding that a theft of property had occurred.29 The 
McGraw court's interpretation is practical because computers and 
cable television are found everywhere and protection against the theft 
of their services becomes an increasingly more important issue. 
Several cases in other jurisdictions shed light on the McGraw situ­
ation and gave support to the McGraw court's decision.30 First, a 
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found in Hancock v. State3l that 
property in a theft could include "all writings of every description, 
provided such property possesses any ascertainable value. "32 Property 
subject to theft, therefore, could include the computer services and 
time that McGraw used without authorization for his personal busi­
ness gain. Thus, under the Texas statute in Hancock, McGraw's ac­
tions would constitute theft of property. 
Further, such support was found in a more recent Alabama case, 
National Surety Corp. v. Applied Systems, Inc. 33 Allied Systems was 
charged with conversion of computer programs dealing with the pay­
roll systems of some of its clients.34 Although the defendants claimed 
that only tangible personal property is subject to the offense of conver­
sion,3s the court found that case law existed which holds that intangi­
ble personal property can indeed be the subject of larceny.36 
Additionally, the Alabama court stated that it would be "inconsistent" 
to find that intangible personal property could be subject to theft and 
yet not be subject to the offense of conversion.37 The court's analysis 
lent support to the Indiana court's decision that intangibles such as the 
use of computer services were property subject to theft.38 Further, at 
least one tangible item had been stolen: the computer print-out of Mc­
Graw's customer data.39 The court, therefore, could find that Mc­
Graw subjected both tangible and intangible property to theft. 
Further support appears in a recent Virginia Supreme Court deci­
29. McGraw, 459 N.E.2d at 65. 
30. Id. at 64-65. 
31. 402 S.W.2d 906 (TEX. CRIM. App. 1966). In Hancock, an employee of a com­
puter corporation was implicated in the theft of computer programs. Id. at 907. 
32. Id. at 908 quoting TEX. PENAL CoDE ANN. § 1418 (Vernon 1974). 
33. 418 So.2d 847 (Ala. 1982). 
34. Id. at 848. 
35. Id. at 849. 
36. Id. at 850. See Latham v. State, 56 Ala. App. 234, 320 So.2d 747 (1975); Han­
cock v. Decker, 379 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1967); Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1121 (1968). 
37. National Surety Corp., 418 So.2d at 850. 
38. McGraw, 459 N.e.2d at 65. 
39. Id. at 63. 
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sion, Evans v. Commonwealth.40 Although the McGraw court did not 
cite Evans,41 the case does bolster the McGraw court's position in that 
it found that the unauthorized taking of a computer print-out of a 
valuable customer list constituted petit larceny.42 Although the fac­
tual similarities of McGraw and Evans are not numerous, the Evans 
opinion supports the concept that the unauthorized taking of a com­
puter print-out constitutes theft. 
Case law in some jurisdictions exists that would lead to an oppo­
site result from the McGraw decision.43 The cases, however, are based 
upon more restrictive statutes than the Illinois statute with which the 
McGraw court dealt.44 In People v. Weg,4S for example, the court 
found the applicable New York statute46 to apply only to unauthor­
ized use of equipment offered for use in a commercial setting, such as 
leasing or hiring.47 Further, the legislature did not intend the statute 
to make an employee's unauthorized use of office equipment a criminal 
offense.48 Under the New York statute, persons commit a theft of 
services when they have unauthorized control of another party's busi­
ness, commercial, or industrial equipment and use the control for their 
own personal service.49 In Weg, the computer was definitely not com­
mercial or industrial in nature; it belonged to a public school district. so 
Additionally, if "business equipment" included any equipment serving 
a function for the owner, as the prosecution proposed, all persons who 
made unauthorized use of their employers' computers, telephones, or 
typewriters would be commiting a criminal offense. s1 Due to the re­
stricted language and nature of the statute, however, at least some un­
authorized use of computer services would be tolerated. The 
unauthorized use of a computer would not be considered criminal be­
havior unless the equipment were commercial, industrial, or business 
40. - Va. -, 308 S.E.2d 126 (1983). 
41. This is most likely due to the fact that the Evans case was decided only three 
months before the McGraw opinion was written. 
42. - Va. at -, 308 S.E.2d at 129. In Evans, two employees of a bank resigned and 
began working for a competitor, taking with them a print-out belonging to the first bank. 
The second bank valued the print-out because it contained information concerning the first 
bank. - Va. at -, 308 S.E.2d at 127-28, 129. 
43. McGraw, 459 N.E.2d at 64. 
44. Id. The applicable Indiana statutes do appear to be rather broad. 
45. 113 Misc. 2d 1017,450 N.Y.S.2d 957 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1982). 
46. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.15, subd. 8. (McKinney Supp. 1984). 
47. Weg, 113 Misc. 2d at 1019-20, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 959. 
48. Id. at 1020,450 N.Y.S.2d at 959. 
49. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.15, subd. 8. (McKinney Supp. 1984). 
50. Weg, 113 Misc. 2d at 1019, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 959. 
51. Id. at 1023, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 961. 
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equipment.52 
A similar holding is found in Lund v. Commonwealth 53 in which 
the applicable statute defined grand larceny as the taking from another 
party money or another thing of value of five dollars or more, or the 
taking from the possession of another, goods and chattels of at least 
$100 in value. 54 Because criminal statutes must be strictly construed 
to protect the rights and liberties of citizens, the unauthorized use of 
computer time cannot be construed as the taking of goods or chat­
tels. 55 "Goods and chattels"· imply that something tangible IS m­
volved, and the use of a computer is intangible. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The most recent case law is not definitive as to the taking of com­
puter services. Because computers are becoming more and more com­
monplace, the problem of takings will become more prevalent. We 
can infer that judicial indecision invites legislative reform. Statutes 
applicable to computer services theft are not uniform, nor do they lead 
to predictable results. Further, because many of the statutes deal with 
theft in general, the courts face the task of interpreting and applying 
laws to situations never intended by lawmakers, again leading to non­
uniform, unpredictable results. The problems will be alleviated as 
more states choose to enact specific computer service theft statutes. 
Ann C Hansen 
52. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.15, subd. S. (McKinney SUpp. 1984). 
53. 217 Va. 688, 232 S.E.2d 745 (1977). 
54. VA. CoDE § IS.1-100 (1950), 1960 VA. Acrs c. 358. 
55. Lund, 217 Va. at 692, 232 S.E.2d at 74S. 
